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Abstract—Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are circuits
designed to extract physical randomness from the underlying
circuit. This randomness depends on the manufacturing process.
It differs for each device enabling chip-level authentication and
key generation [1] applications. We present a protocol utilizing a
PUF for secure data transmission. Parties each have a PUF used
for encryption and decryption; this is facilitated by constraining
the PUF to be commutative. This framework is evaluated with
a primitive permutation network - a barrel shifter [2]. Physical
randomness is derived from the delay of different shift paths.
Barrel shifter (BS) PUF captures the delay of different shift
paths. This delay is entangled with message bits before they
are sent across an insecure channel. BS-PUF is implemented
using transmission gates; their characteristics ensure same-chip
reproducibility, a necessary property of PUFs. Post-layout simu-
lations of a common centroid layout [3] 8-level barrel shifter in
0.13 µm technology assess uniqueness, stability and randomness
properties. BS-PUFs pass all selected NIST statistical randomness
tests [4]. Stability similar to Ring Oscillator (RO) PUFs under
environment variation is shown. Logistic regression of 100, 000
plaintext-ciphertext pairs (PCPs) failed to successfully model BS-
PUF behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
Encryption/decryption algorithms form the backbone of
modern public key infrastructure which supports a broad set
of activities such as e-commerce and digital currency. Math-
ematical cryptosystems such as RSA [5] can take millions of
clock cycles. Even symmetric encryption/decryption through
AES takes 10-20 clock cycles. Moreover, even though their
security is predicated on a hard mathematical problem such
as prime number factoring, a mathematical model exists for
an adversary [6]. Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) source
physical randomness of a silicon foundry with a potential
appeal of unmodelable, physical functions. They have been
used to generate unique physical identities, and to seed key
generation. Such PUFs offer both inter-chip variability and
same-chip reproducibility. The variability ensures that distinct
devices produce different outputs given the same input. Repro-
ducibility, on the other hand, is valuable for predictability and
determinism in the device authentication behavior. As a result,
PUFs based on complex physical systems provide significantly
higher physical security over the traditional systems which rely
on storing secrets in nonvolatile memory. In addition, special
Fig. 1. Encryption protocol with message encryption based on commutative
PUFs fBob and fAlice.
manufacturing processes are not required to produce PUF
devices. This advantage makes PUF devices a cost-effective
and reliable alternative to mathematical randomness sources.
So far, the use of PUFs in cryptography is somewhat limited
- the most common being key generation or random number
generation. Chen used analog circuits to support cryptography
with some elements of PUF like randomness [7]. Choi et
al. deployed a variant of arbiter PUF to replace symmetric
encryption in RFID domain as an authentication mechanism
[8]. This was based on the earlier work of Suh et al. that
deployed PUFs for anti-counterfeiting in RFIDs [9]. Che et
al. described another authentication protocol based on PUFs
[10]. [11] developed an IoT communication protocol based
on PUFs. [12] developed a code encryption engine based on
PUFs for supporting a secure execution environment similar
to AEGIS [13]. The key difference between a processor
secure execution environment and general encryption is that
for the former scenario the processor platform is both the
source and destination for the communication. In a processor
secure execution environment, both the sender and receiver
have access to the same physical PUF on the same platform.
However, for general encryption, this assumption is violated.
Both the sender and receiver possess distinct and different
PUFs. We show a general communication protocol based on
commutative PUFs.
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The key contributions of this paper are: (1) We explore
several PUFs based information exchange protocols which
serves to encrypt/decrypt information, find the best protocol
through analysis; (2) this protocol requires PUFs to be phys-
ically commutative. We develop a framework for physically
commutative PUFs based on permutation networks; (3) We
evaluate permutation networks based physically commutative
PUF framework with a primitive permutation network using
barrel shifters. Barrel shifters have symmetric input to output
path delays. Hence if two different paths within the same
barrel shifter generate randomly uncorrelated delays, it is a
strong lower bound for randomness in general permutation
networks with more skewed path delays; (4) The results
show good same chip, same path delay reproducibility; good
differentiation between different chip, same path delay and
same chip, different path delay; delays within 1-bit accuracy
for the logic high and logic low propagation through the same
path demonstrates physical commutativity; and good pseudo-
random number generator properties for delay.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces
communication protocol. Section III illustrates commutative
PUF encryption protocol. Section IV shows the schematic of
barrel shifter PUF. Section V presents the detailed circuit im-
plementation of barrel shifter PUF. Variability/reproducibility
and commutativity test results based on post-layout simula-
tions are presented in Section VI. Performance of BS-PUFs
based encryption protocol is evaluated in Section VII. Sections
VIII and IX discuss future work and conclusions.
II. COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
Fig. 1 depicts Bob as the sender and Alice as the receiver.
Both Bob and Alice have their own PUF. If Bob encrypts his
message m with his PUF as fBob(m), Alice has no way to
decrypt it except to ask Bob to decrypt it for her. The following
protocol overcomes this asymmetry.
1) Bob encrypts the message m with fBob.
2) Bob sends fBob(m) to Alice.
3) Alice encrypts fBob(m) with fAlice. (At this point, Alice
does not know the message m.)
4) Alice sends fAlice(fBob(m)) to Bob.
5) Bob decrypts fAlice(fBob(m)) with f−1Bob and obtains
fAlice(m).
6) Bob sends fAlice(m) to Alice.
7) Alice decrypts fAlice(m) with f−1Alice and obtains the
message m.
Message confidentiality is maintained by entangling mes-
sage bits with physical randomness. The entangling process
must be commutative so that the order of fAlice and fBob
can be changed. Decryption of entangled messages requires
reversibility. The entangled message m′ must exhibit a non-
linear relationship with m; this makes it hard for an eaves-
dropper to learn m by examining intermediate messages.
The circuit design and encryption protocol enable the
commutative, invertible, and non-linear relationship properties
of messages. Section III describes a mechanism for BS-
Fig. 2. Cipher block chaining methods are used to encrypt (a) and decrypt
(b) messages. This prevents the adversary from identifying plaintext patterns;
it ensures identical blocks of plaintext encrypt to different ciphertext.
PUF-based encryption. The BS circuit design is detailed in
Sections IV, V.
III. ENCRYPTION PROTOCOL
Encryption must entangle the physical randomness of BS-
PUF with the message. Physical randomness is extracted by
measuring the delay of message bits along a shift path. An
XOR of the message bits and delay accomplishes entangle-
ment; this allows for commutativity and reversibility.
A. Encrypting Large Messages
A BS-PUF uses an n-bit key as shift amount. This al-
lows for a a 2n-bit BS-PUF challenge (message) resulting
in a 2n-bit BS-PUF response. Alternately, one could view
(n− bit key, 2n − bit message) as a challenge. We take the
former 2n-bit challenge view in this paper. For a barrel-shifter,
practical values for n are limited to be in the range 7 − 10
bits leading to a message block size of 128− 1024 bits. This
means that a method of entanglement/encryption for plaintexts
greater than 2n bits is needed.
Entanglement could occur by serializing the blocks of
plaintext at BS-PUF input and concatenating the generated
ciphertexts. However, this approach reveals patterns in the
plaintext; the same plaintext will always encrypt to the same
ciphertext. This leaks information by allowing an adversary to
identify plaintext patterns.
The technique of cipher block chaining (CBC) is typically
applied in block ciphers such as AES [14]. Like AES, BS-
PUF encrypts a fixed number of plaintext bits. Thus, it can
be viewed as a block cipher. A practical barrel-shifter or
permutation network implementation could consist of 128-
1024 bit blocks.
Fig. 3. (1) Bob applies fBob and (2) sends the result to Alice. (3) Alice
applies fAlice and (4) sends the result to Bob. (5) Bob applies f
−1
Bob and
(6) returns the result to Alice. (7) Alice applies f−1Alice hoping to recover the
message. Unfortunately, f−1 does not subtract delay from the correct bit in
(5), (7); the correct message is not received by Alice. This scheme fails to be
commutative.
Fig. 2 applies CBC to two blocks of plaintext. Before
applying BS-PUF, the plaintext pi is XOR’ed with the pre-
vious ciphertext ci−1. The output of BS-PUF using key K,
BS − PUF (pi,K), is the ciphertext, c′i. Thus, encryption of
the ith block is ci = BS − PUF (pi ⊕ ci−1,K). The result
is a cipher text c1||c2|| . . . ||cm for m blocks where || denotes
concatenation.
c0 is an initialization vector (IV). This IV must be updated
with each message; otherwise the same plaintext will encrypt
to the same ciphertext. This would again allow an eavesdrop-
per to identify patterns. Unlike traditional CBC algorithms,
IV for BS-PUFs based encryption does not need to be public
because ciphertext will be sent back to sender for decryption.
It could be generated with any PUF, e.g. SRAM PUFs [15].
Decryption utilizes BS-PUF’s inverse. pi is recovered by the
reverse process. Ciphertext ci is given to the inverse BS-PUF
operation. The ⊕ of the output and ci−1 is then taken. Thus,
decryption of the ith block is pi = BS − PUF−1(ci,K) ⊕
ci−1.
Message encryption requires a secret key. The key deter-
mines the bit shift path; it is used as shift amount. The BS-
PUF response depends both on the challenge (plaintext) and
the key. The key does not change as frequently as the plaintext
does.
Some of the desirable characteristics of BS-PUF are as
follows. BS-PUF is fast. Encryption takes multiple rounds
with a traditional block cipher. BS-PUF makes only one pass
through the shifter or permutation hardware.
B. Single Block Encryption
In this subsection, several permutation schemes are dis-
cussed for single block encryption.
Fig. 4. Sharing a key allows both parties to perform the same permutation.
This ensures the delay is subtracted from the correct bit when performing
the inverse f−1PUFl for l = 1, 2. Entropy is added into public message by bit
shifting.
1) Asymmetric Key Encryption: Encrypting without a
shared key is ideal.
Section II dictates invertibility and commutativity as com-
munication protocol requirements.
PUF f must be a one-to-one function to achieve encryption
and invertibility for decryption. Many classical PUFs, such
as RO-PUFs [16], [17], [18], [19] and arbiter PUFs [20],
[21], cluster the challenges into equivalence classes on a set
of attributes resulting in the same response per challenge
equivalence class. Arbiter PUF uses relative bit arrival time
as the clustering attribute. RO PUF uses relative oscillator
frequencies. The end result is that this makes these PUFs not
invertible, since the mapping is many-to-one.
Further note that physical invertibility is distinct from
logical invertibility. A mathematical one-to-one function has
logical invertibility, but may not be physically invertible.
Physical invertibility is applicable to the PUF physical at-
tribute measurement process. In the forward computation,
inputs traverse the computation paths to the output; physical
measurements may take place at various points along these
paths. In the inverse computation, output bits travel to the
inputs through the identical computation paths in reverse. The
physical measurements of the same physical attribute occur in
the inverse computation. These forward and inverse physical
measurements need to be reproducible at all measurement
points from input to output.
Permutation functions provide the necessary one-to-one re-
lationship. Permutations create a non-linear relationship from
input bits to output bits. Due to this property, an adversary
cannot create a useful mathematical model describing the
input, output relationship. For a n-bit data, there exist N = n!
permutations denoted by pi0, pi1, ...piN−1. Each pii captures
some permutation (i0, i1, . . . , in−1), where bit k 7→ ik. In
other words, the bit at 0 is routed to bit position i0 in the
output. A key K is used to select this mapping. We call this
Fig. 5. Invertible and Commutative PUF protocol: PUF1(fBob) and PUF2(fAlice) illustrate the PUF composition and how barrel shifter PUF is used for
encryption and decryption processes. Assume both PUF1 and PUF2 are two stages BS-PUFs, key1(PUF1) is (1, 0), key2(PUF2) is (0, 1). For PUF1,
bit x0 (x1) goes to output bit position y1 (y2). The encrypted bit output at y1 (y2) is x0⊕D(0, 1)m (x1⊕D(1, 2)m). D(i, i′ )m is the mth least significant
bit of the delay from input bit i to the output bit i
′
. Permutator is added after each PUF to shift each bit back to its original position after encryption.
a keyed PUF: Ri,K = f(K,Pi). The PUF response is derived
from the shift path delay.
The protocol requires the entanglement procedure to be
commutative. Entanglement adds a bit from the delay of
each path to the plaintext. Thus, entanglement is expressed
as f(KBob, Pi) = Pi ⊕ DBob. This is commutative because
’⊕’ is commutative. Note that the entanglement between the
physical delay attribute and logical bits can occur at multiple
points during the flight of message bits from input to output;
each measurement point is also an entanglement point.
Our first version of encryption protocol is based on in-
vertible and commutative PUFs. Invertibility requires using a
raw physical property like delay. The reversible computation
principle states that any information loss makes a process
irreversible [22]. Many PUFs derive their response through the
comparison of physical properties. Arbiter PUF uses a race
between two paths. RO-PUF uses a frequency comparison.
These comparisons provide reproducibility by including a
wide margin of noise before comparison output changes, but
information is lost.
The proposed PUF is based on a barrel shifter. Constructing
it with precisely sized transmission gates makes its delay
independent of bit state 0 or 1. Bit propagation delay for
forward path and inverse path is remarkably stable and consis-
tent regardless of bit state. This is due to symmetric physical
structure of MOSFET’s source and drain. As we discuss in
the following, physical commutativity and invertibility in our
protocol is only achieved if the physical delay on the paths
is bit state independent. The Step 5 of Fig. 1 when Bob
computes f−1Bob is dealing with a different bit pattern at the
output of Bob’s PUF than what was computed in Step 1 at
Bob’s PUF’s output. This is because the Step 5 bit pattern has
an additional permutation applied to it by Alice, which is not
known to Bob. An alternative implementation could have used
pass transistors. However, it is hard to equalize the delay for
0 and 1 through a pass transistor. Thus, transmission gates are
used to make the delay plaintext independent.
Asymmetric key encryption protocol in Section II is based
on invertible and commutative BS-PUFs; which are defined as
follows:
Invertible PUF: An invertible keyed PUF f on input x and
key K: for f(x,K) = y =⇒ f−1(y,K) = x, where f−1
is computed on the same PUF in the reverse direction. Note
that the PUF function f entangles a logical component and a
physical component, and both need to be invertible.
PUFs designed to be used directly for encryption need two
input sequences: (1) key for response function selection as in
a permutation selector, (2) plaintext to be encrypted.
Commutative PUF: Assume there is a composition of
two commutative PUFs PUF1 and PUF2. This means
PUF2(PUF1(x)) = PUF1(PUF2(x)). Note that both
logical and physical commutativity are needed for such a com-
mutative PUF. For BS-PUF, the entanglement function must
be commutative for physical commutativity in addition to the
physical measurements being the same in PUF2(PUF1(x))
and PUF1(PUF2(x)); this requires the physical measure-
ments to be invariant of the bit state. The physical measure-
ments are completely defined by the key K for a given PUF.
2) Protocol Without Permutation: In the first version of
design, each PUF fPUF1 and fPUF2 is a permutation network
keyed by key1 and key2 respectively. Key key1 selects a
permutation pikey1 from a large set of possible permutations -
Keccak permutation [23], [24] could be used for instance. The
implementation, however, needs to be physically and logically
reversible consisting of transmission gates. We assume that
for a permutation pikey1 which maps ith input bit to the i
′
th
output bit and jth input bit to j
′
th output bit, we capture the
exact delays for each input-output path. Let D(i, i
′
) denotes
the delay of the path from input i to output i
′
for pikey1 in
fPUF1 . Let D(j, j
′
) be defined likewise. We will describe how
we can capture these delays by using timer capture and edge
detector functions in Section V.
For each PUF, the output bit yi can be expressed as an
entanglement function e(xpi−1key(j), D(pi
−1
key(j), j)). Here e is
an entanglement function between the bit routed to output
j (xpi−1key(j)) and the delay of this path from pi
−1
key(j) to j.
The delay D(pi−1key(j), j) can be quantized to any resolution
of k bits. If we use all of the k bits of D(pi−1key(j), j) to do
encryption at the jth output bit, we expand the n-bit input
to an nk-bit output. Assuming we want to retain the same
output resolution of n-bits, one option would be to perform
an XOR (⊕) of the mth bit of D(pi−1key(j), j) with the input bit
xpi−1key(j)
to generate yj leading to the entanglement function
yj = e(xpi−1key(j)
, D(pi−1key(j), j)m). XOR is a good choice
because it is commutative and associative. Since the least
significant bit (LSB) and 2nd LSB of D(pi−1key(j), j) is likely
least correlated with the delay of other paths, we have used
them in entanglement. The corresponding simulation results
are shown in Section VI.
Let us assume that the delays of the permutation func-
tion pikey1 in fPUF1 are denoted by D(pi
−1
key1
(j), j) for a
path from input pi−1key1(j) to output j and the delays of
the permutation function pikey2 in fPUF2 are denoted by
d(j, pikey2(j)) for a path from input j to output pikey2(j).
Assume that pi−1key1(j) = i, pikey2(j) = k, then the output
zk = (xi ⊕D(i, j)m)⊕ d(j, k)m is generated. The mth least
significant bit of PUF2’s delay captured by the d function is
XORed with fPUF1 ’s output.
Clearly, the RHS of expression zk = (xi ⊕ D(i, j)m) ⊕
d(j, k)m is commutative due to commutativity of operator ⊕
- it does not matter whether fPUF1 is applied first or fPUF2
is applied first. However, this commutativity statement is only
correct for a specific bit routing, but incorrect for encrypted
data.
Consider PUF1 with pikey1 = (0 7→ 1, 1 7→ 2, 2 7→ 3, 3 7→
0) for a 4 bit input x0, x1, x2, x3 and PUF2 with pikey2 =
(0 7→ 2, 1 7→ 3, 2 7→ 0, 3 7→ 1). Composition of fPUF1 ◦
fPUF2 = (0 7→ 1, 1 7→ 2, 2 7→ 3, 3 7→ 0) ◦ (0 7→ 2, 1 7→
3, 2 7→ 0, 3 7→ 1) = (0 7→ 3, 1 7→ 0, 2 7→ 1, 3 7→ 2). By
going over the communication protocol in Fig. 1 step by step,
a defect becomes apparent. Thecomplete verification process
is shown in Fig. 3.
In the following analysis, permutations are abbreviated
according to output positions for simplicity. e.g. (0 7→ 1, 1 7→
2, 2 7→ 3, 3 7→ 0) is abbreviated to (1, 2, 3, 0). Assume
piPUF1 = (1, 2, 3, 0) and piPUF2 = (2, 3, 0, 1).
• Step 1: Apply fPUF1 to (x0, x1, x2, x3) result-
Fig. 6. Block diagram of the delay test circuit with two propagation examples.
When key0 = 1 and key1 = 0, Input0 passes through the light grey
path. There is one bit shift at the first level and no shift at second level,
Input0 → Output1. When key0 = 0 and key1 = 1, Input0 passes
through the dark grey path. There is no shift at the first level and there is a
two bit shift at the second level, Input0 → Output2.
ing in (1, 2, 3, 0)(x0, x1, x2, x3), which equals (x3 ⊕
D(3, 0)m, x0⊕D(0, 1)m, x1⊕D(1, 2)m, x2⊕D(2, 3)m).
• Step 3: Apply fPUF2 to fPUF1 ’s output as in
(2, 3, 0, 1)(1, 2, 3, 0)(x0, x1, x2, x3). This equals (x1 ⊕
D(1, 2)m ⊕ d(2, 0)m, x2 ⊕ D(2, 3)m ⊕ d(3, 1)m, x3 ⊕
D(3, 0)m ⊕ d(0, 2)m, x0 ⊕D(0, 1)m ⊕ d(1, 3)m).
• Step 5: Now invert the output. Apply f−1PUF1 to
(2, 3, 0, 1)(1, 2, 3, 0)(x0, x1, x2, x3). f−1PUF1 results in
(1, 2, 3, 0)−1(2, 3, 0, 1)(1, 2, 3, 0)(x0, x1, x2, x3) which
equals (x2 ⊕ D(2, 3)m ⊕ d(3, 1)m ⊕ D′(0, 1)m, x3 ⊕
D(3, 0)m ⊕ d(0, 2)m ⊕ D′(1, 2)m, x0 ⊕ D(0, 1)m ⊕
d(1, 3)m ⊕ D′(2, 3)m, x1 ⊕ D(1, 2)m ⊕ d(2, 0)m ⊕
D
′
(3, 0)m). D
′
(i, i
′
) denotes the backward path delay
from output i
′
to input i. According to post-layout
simulations, D
′
(i, i
′
) is always equal to D(i, i
′
) in
BS-PUFs.
• Step 7: Further applying f−1PUF2 as in
(2, 3, 0, 1)−1(1, 2, 3, 0)−1(2, 3, 0, 1)(1, 2, 3, 0)(x0, x1, x2,
x3) results in (x0 ⊕D(0, 1)m ⊕ d(1, 3)m ⊕D′(2, 3)m ⊕
d
′
(0, 2)m, x1 ⊕ D(1, 2)m ⊕ d(2, 0)m ⊕ D′(3, 0)m ⊕
d
′
(1, 3)m, x2 ⊕ D(2, 3)m ⊕ d(3, 1)m ⊕ D′(0, 1)m ⊕
d
′
(2, 0)m, x3 ⊕ D(3, 0)m ⊕ d(0, 2)m ⊕ D′(1, 2)m ⊕
d
′
(3, 1)m). This logical result is correct in routing xi
back to the ith bit position, but the physical delay terms
are completely mixed up and do not cancel each other.
3) Protocol With Permutation: In order to ensure the
correct routing and commutativity, we modify the original
permutation protocol by adding a permutation after each PUF.
The primary function of this permutation is routing xi back
to the ith position from position pikey1(i) before sending the
message at the end of Step 1. The complementary key, key1,
that results in the permutation pi−1key1 is used; it routes bits back
to their original position. Mathematically, (pikey1 ◦ (pikey1 =
pi−1key1)) = 1 where 1 is the identity permutation. Bit shifting
Fig. 7. Schematic of 1-bit input logic. Each input bit is controlled by an input
logic unit.
to restore the orginal message bit order is the only function
of this permutation. No delay is added.
An example of this protocol is shown in Fig. 5 with the
following detailed description.
• Step 1: fBob permutes x0, x1, x2, x3 as in
(1, 2, 3, 0)(x0, x1, x2, x3). It computes the physical
delay encrypted bit vector, (x3 ⊕ D(3, 0)m, x0 ⊕
D(0, 1)m, x1 ⊕ D(1, 2)m, x2 ⊕ D(2, 3)m). Before
sending it to Alice, Bob’s complementary permutation,
called permutator in Fig. 5 is applied to generate (x0 ⊕
D(0, 1)m, x1⊕D(1, 2)m, x2⊕D(2, 3)m, x3⊕D(3, 0)m).
In this new permutation protocol, the logical permutation
does not add to the confusion at all unlike in AES
or Keccak protocols. Confusion is achieved from the
permuted physical delay properties of the PUF. Which
Path delay bits are combined with each input bit is still
hidden (through confusion) from the adversary through
key driven pi.
• Step 3: fAlice is applied as (2, 3, 0, 1)(x0 ⊕
D(0, 1)m, x1⊕D(1, 2)m, x2⊕D(2, 3)m, x3⊕D(3, 0)m),
resulting in (x2 ⊕ D(2, 3)m ⊕ d(2, 0)m, x3 ⊕
D(3, 0)m ⊕ d(3, 1)m, x0 ⊕ D(0, 1)m ⊕
d(0, 2)m, x1 ⊕ D(1, 2)m ⊕ d(1, 3)m). Applying
Alice’s complementary permutation results in
(x0⊕D(0, 1)m⊕d(0, 2)m, x1⊕D(1, 2)m⊕d(1, 3)m, x2⊕
D(2, 3)m ⊕ d(2, 0)m, x3 ⊕D(3, 0)m ⊕ d(3, 1)m).
• Step 5: Apply f−1Bob to (x0 ⊕D(0, 1)m ⊕ d(0, 2)m, x1 ⊕
D(1, 2)m ⊕ d(1, 3)m, x2 ⊕ D(2, 3)m ⊕ d(2, 0)m, x3 ⊕
D(3, 0)m ⊕ d(3, 1)m).
Decryption follows a similar process. However, the direc-
tion of message transmission is reversed and the inverse
permutations are used. This is where physical invertibility
helps recover the original forward delay vector in the
reverse direction.
Thus, (1, 2, 3, 0)(2, 3, 0, 1)(x0, x1, x2, x3)) is rearranged
by Bob’s permutator first. This is (x3 ⊕ D(3, 0)m ⊕
d(3, 1)m, x0 ⊕ D(0, 1)m ⊕ d(0, 2)m, x1 ⊕ D(1, 2)m ⊕
d(1, 3)m, x2 ⊕ D(2, 3)m ⊕ d(2, 0)m). This rearranged
result is given to to PUF1 resulting in (x0⊕D(0, 1)m⊕
d(0, 2)m ⊕ D′(0, 1)m, x1 ⊕ D(1, 2)m ⊕ d(1, 3)m ⊕
D
′
(1, 2)m, x2 ⊕D(2, 3)m ⊕ d(2, 0)m ⊕D′(2, 3)m, x3 ⊕
Fig. 8. Shift Unit of barrel shifter. If key = 1 (key = 0), N1/P1 is on
(N2/P2 is off), then output equals Input A; otherwise, output equals Input
B.
D(3, 0)m ⊕ d(3, 1)m ⊕D′(3, 0)m).
Transmission gates show symmetric delays for forward
and backward paths; D(i, j) always equals D
′
(i, j).
Thus, the delay terms cancel. The result after applying
f−1Bob is equal to (x0 ⊕ d(0, 2)m, x1 ⊕ d(1, 3)m, x2 ⊕
d(2, 0)m, x3 ⊕ d(3, 1)m).
• Step 7: f−1Alice is applied. First, Alice’s permutator will
rotate the bits giving (x2⊕ d(2, 0)m, x3⊕ d(3, 1)m, x0⊕
d(0, 2)m, x1 ⊕ d(1, 3)m). Rotated bits are then given
to PUF2 in the reverse direction resulting in (x0 ⊕
d(0, 2)m ⊕ d′(0, 2)m, x1 ⊕ d(1, 3)m ⊕ d′(1, 3)m, x2 ⊕
d(2, 0)m ⊕ d′(2, 0)m, x3 ⊕ d(3, 1)m ⊕ d′(3, 1)m). The
delay terms cancel. Alice receives the original message
(x0, x1, x2, x3) sent by Bob.
4) Symmetric Key Encryption: The original protocol in
Section III-B2 subtracted the delay from the incorrect bit in
the inverse permutation. The protocol shown in Section III-B3
solves the original problem. However, it contains a fatal flaw;
Using ⊕ for entanglement creates a linear relationship between
messages in-flight between Bob and Alice. An eavesdropper
can retrieve the original message from the in-flight messages.
Consider Fig. 5 as an example. The first bit in original
message is x0. The encrypted first bit sent from Bob to Alice
in Step 2 is B′ = x0 ⊕ D(0, 1). Then from Alice to Bob
in Step 4, B′′ = x0 ⊕ D(0, 1) ⊕ d(0, 2). The decrypted first
bit sent from Bob to Alice in Step 6 is B′′′ = x0 ⊕ d(0, 2).
B′, B′′ and B′′′ are all public messages. An eavesdropper can
extract the original message by:
1) Inferring Bob’s PUF’s delay information by taking XOR
of B′′ and B′′′. B′′ ⊕ B′′′ = x0 ⊕D(0, 1) ⊕ d(0, 2) ⊕
x0 ⊕ d(0, 2) = D(0, 1).
2) Then the original message can be extracted by an XOR
of B′ and Bob’s PUF’s delay, B′ ⊕ D(0, 1) = x0 ⊕
D(0, 1)⊕D(0, 1) = x0.
In order to eliminate this problem, BS-PUF must permute
bits in public messages, which we could not do and yet
preserve commutativity and invertibility. One possible solu-
tion that allows permuted public messages while preserving
commutativity and invertibility is to let Bob and Alice share
Fig. 9. (a) D Flip-Flop – Triggered by rising edge. The output, Q, is
high when there is a rising edge at input, in. (b) Edge Detector – The
output reflects a transition at the input. (c) Positive edge trigger generator
– Produces a pulse in response to a positive edge at the input, in. (d) Output
Logic – Captures the path delay; this is provided to entanglement logic.
the same key. The corresponding protocol is shown in Fig. 4.
In the shared key protocol, Bob permutes the input message
with piK entangling it with his delay. Alice reverses the
permutation using pi−1K entangling it with her delay. Note that
the shared key is K. The bits are in their original positions
in the message sent to Bob for decryption. Note that the
entanglement with both PUFs’ delays protects this message.
The delay will be un-entangled from the correct bits in the
subsequent decryption steps. The bit order is different in the
message from Bob to Alice versus in the message from Alice
to Bob. This avoids linear leakage of information in XOR
based equations on these two messages.
Details of the shared key scheme presented in Fig. 4 are as
follows.
• Step 1: Bob permutes x0, x1, x2, x3 with pi =
(1, 2, 3, 0) and gets (x3⊕D(3, 0)m, x0⊕D(0, 1)m, x1⊕
D(1, 2)m, x2⊕D(2, 3)m). It is sent to Alice without any
further bit level routing; this achieves bit-level confusion
of the public message.
• Step 3: fAlice performs the reverse permutation pi−1 of
fBob and simultaneously applies Alice’s delay (pi−1 =
(3, 0, 1, 2)). After fAlice is applied, all bits are rotated
back to their original position but each bit is encrypted
with two physical delay values. In this example, after
applying fAlice we get (x0 ⊕D(0, 1)m ⊕ d(1, 0)m, x1 ⊕
D(1, 2)m ⊕ d(2, 1)m, x2 ⊕ D(2, 3)m ⊕ d(3, 2)m, x3 ⊕
D(3, 0)m ⊕ d(0, 3)m).
• Step 5: f−1Bob is applied. Permutation pi is applied again
and delay added in Step 1 is cancelled by XOR. Then
message sent to Alice is converted to (x3 ⊕D(3, 0)m ⊕
d(0, 3)m ⊕ D(3, 0)m, x0 ⊕ D(0, 1)m ⊕ d(1, 0)m ⊕
D(0, 1)m, x1 ⊕ D(1, 2)m ⊕ d(2, 1)m ⊕ D(1, 2)m, x2 ⊕
Fig. 10. The path delay capture unit tests for and stores the path delay. The
edge detector detects an output transition; S equal to output will not be
detected. Consequently, the transmission path receives S and S successively;
a transition at output is guaranteed.
D(2, 3)m ⊕ d(3, 2)m ⊕ D(2, 3)m) which is (x3 ⊕
d(0, 3)m, x0 ⊕ d(1, 0)m, x1 ⊕ d(2, 1)m, x2 ⊕ d(3, 2)m)
• Step 7: f−1Alice is applied, bit positions are rotated back
again, and delay added in Step 3 is cancelled by XOR.
The message from the previous step is converted to
(x0⊕d(1, 0)m⊕d(1, 0)m, x1⊕d(2, 1)m⊕d(2, 1)m, x2⊕
d(3, 2)m ⊕ d(3, 2)m, x3 ⊕ d(0, 3)m ⊕ d(0, 3)m), which
equals the original message x0, x1, x2, x3.
Evaluating all messages crossing the insecure channel,
M ′ = (x3 ⊕ D(3, 0)m, x0 ⊕ D(0, 1)m, x1 ⊕ D(1, 2)m, x2 ⊕
D(2, 3)m), M ′′ = (x0⊕D(0, 1)m⊕d(1, 0)m, x1⊕D(1, 2)m⊕
d(2, 1)m, x2⊕D(2, 3)m⊕d(3, 2)m, x3⊕D(3, 0)m⊕d(0, 3)m),
M ′′′ = (x3 ⊕ d(0, 3)m, x0 ⊕ d(1, 0)m, x1 ⊕ d(2, 1)m, x2 ⊕
d(3, 2)m), no linear relationships exist among any pairs of
messages that yield information to a man-in-the-middle. No
duplicate delays appear at any bit position. There is no way to
retrieve original message from the in flight messages without
the shared key and access to Bob and Alice’s PUFs.
All messages are protected while traversing the insecure
channel. The permutation applied by Bob protects the first
message as it travels to Alice. Entanglement with both Alice
and Bob’s delay protects Alice’s response. The permutation
then protects the final message from Bob to Alice.
IV. BARREL SHIFTER PUF DESIGN
We evaluate a barrel shifter as a potential invertible and
commutative PUF. The block diagram of a barrel shifter is
shown in Fig. 6. For simplicity, only two shift levels are shown.
Output Logic is added to capture path delay D(i, i′). A Event
Counter is initialized to 0. The RST signal simultaneously
starts the Event Counter and releases the input message. The
delay is captured by reading the Event Counter when the
Output Logic detects a transition. Finally, the entanglement
block in Output Logic entangles delay information (LSB or
2nd LSB of delay) with the output bit.
Each shift stage is logically similar to an arbiter PUF [25]
stage.
Key bits determine the shift amount s =
∑k
i=0(keyi ∗ 2i).
Thus, keyi is applied from LSB to MSB, from left to right.
The key determines the shift amount. For example, in diagram
in Fig. 6, key = {0, 1} encodes for right shift by 2 in the
second stage. Consequently, Input0 traverses a different path;
provides a different delay results with different keys.
The delay variation is generated by transistor-level mis-
match [26] and doping variability [27]. Variation accumulates
over several stages. It is then significantly large to be detected
by the Output Logic.
BS-PUF must be invertible; this property facilitates decryp-
tion. Consequently, the physical delay measurements must not
depend on the bit state; they should be a function only of the
path.
V. CIRCUIT IMPLEMENTATION
A commutative PUF based on a barrel shifter is imple-
mented in hardware. Transmission gates implement the shift
paths. The circuit is subdivided into 3 components: input logic,
shift unit and output logic.
A. Input logic
Input logic is used to trigger the delay test system. It is a
3-input, 1-output circuit that connects the input signal S or
its inverse S to output terminal (Fig. 7). Input logic consists
of three transmission gates. RST (reset) is used to control
ON/OFF status of the first transmission gate. When RST is
high, Input travels through the first gate and arrives at an
intermediate node. Otherwise, it is blocked. REV (reverse)
determines whether Input is inverted. Input will be inverted
when REV = 1. The function definition for input logic is:
output = RST • (REV ⊕ input).
B. Shift unit
Shift units implement the path selection and form shift
stages. Shift unit size determines the magnitude of delay. We
construct a barrel shifter with 8 shift stages for testing. Each
layer 256 contains shift units. Each stage shifts by either 27−n
or 0 where n is the stage index.
Each shift unit is a 4-input, 1-output circuit show in Fig. 8.
Either inputA or inputB is mapped to ouput. The mapping
is determined by the key. A key value of 1 causes the upper
transmission gate to open; output then becomes inputA.
Otherwise, output becomes inputB.
The path delay value should vary depending on the shift
path. Path delay primarily depends on shift units’ transmission
gates. Adding additional load capacitance after each trans-
mission gate or accumulating variation over several stages of
transmission gate enlarge the delay; it becomes detectable by
the path delay counter.
In BS-PUFs, PUFs uniqueness depends on how much delay
variation could be provided by same path on different chip.
Modifying transistor area is the main method for increasing
the inter-chip variation. Transistor delay variation is inversely
proportional to transistor area [28]. Sizing transistors smaller
results in increased delay variation. However, BS-PUF requires
plaintext independent path delay. Path delay for a 1-valued
bit compared to a 0-valued bit differs for minimum transistor
sizes.Hence larger transistors are used in shift units.
C. Output logic
Output logic measures/captures path delay. Output logic
for each bit contains 3 parts: counter, edge detector trigger
generator and entanglement logic (Fig. 9(d)).
Counter takes CLK and RST as input producing a 10-bit
output; it counts the number of rising edges of CLK. Setting
RST high resets the counter to 0. The path delay is expressed
as (input clock period)× (counter value).
Edge detector trigger generator generates a pulse in re-
sponse to at transition at its input. it includes an edge detector
(Fig. 9(b)) and a positive edge trigger generator (Fig. 9(c)).
Edge detector converts a rising or falling edge into a rising
edge at its output. Positive edge trigger generator converts the
rising edge from edge detector into a pulse.
The output logic works as follows. First, a rising/falling
edge at input produces a pulse at edge detector trigger
generator output. This pulse enables the transmission gate
in Fig. 9(d) for a short time period (2ns). During this time,
counter output is captured; it must not change while being
captured. Thus, enable time period must be shorter than clock
period (4ns). Entanglement logic extracts the mth LSB of
delay D(i, i
′
). Computing XOR of this bit with the input signal
xi results in the entangled output bit.
The output logic works by detecting a transition. An tran-
sition occurring depends on the previous output value. Thus,
the output logic is incapable of detecting unchanging output
values. An output transition is forced by providing xi before
xi at the input.
D. Path Delay Testing
The input logic, shift unit and output logic work together to
capture the path delay. The following five steps are necessary.
1) Set xi as input and reset input logic.
2) Wait for xi to arrive at output logic.
3) Reset input logic and clock counter, set xi as input.
4) Wait as xi travels the path determined by key triggering
a transition at the output logic.
5) Encrypt using the captured counter value.
VI. POST-LAYOUT SIMULATION RESULT
The entanglement logic utilizes a 1-bit result from the path
delay. The path delay capture logic provides a multiple-bit
delay counter. One bit must be chosen; it must be shown
to have the requisite properties for BS-PUF: (1) inter-chip
variability, (2) intra-chip reproducability, (3) randomness, (4)
commutativity.
TABLE I
NIST TEST RESULTS OF LSB RESPONSE
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 P-VALUE PROPORTION STATISTICAL TEST
16 21 13 19 19 23 16 18 21 34 0.099513 198/200 Frequency
12 24 20 24 12 28 22 15 27 16 0.068999 199/200 BlockFrequency
18 20 20 12 16 19 26 11 31 27 0.028817 199/200 CumulativeSums
17 19 15 14 15 17 34 15 27 27 0.011791 200/200 CumulativeSums
19 14 24 32 16 15 21 18 19 22 0.191687 198/200 Runs
19 16 15 16 24 19 25 22 23 21 0.769527 194/200 Serial
18 20 20 24 16 17 20 24 24 17 0.890582 197/200 Serial
TABLE II
NIST TEST RESULTS OF 2ND LSB RESPONSE
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9 c10 P-VALUE PROPORTION STATISTICAL TEST
15 24 22 19 15 17 10 21 20 37 0.005166 200/200 Frequency
12 18 24 27 15 26 20 13 29 16 0.048716 200/200 BlockFrequency
11 21 20 26 16 22 19 9 24 32 0.012650 200/200 CumulativeSums
15 21 15 21 18 18 28 11 28 25 0.099513 200/200 CumulativeSums
22 25 26 20 18 20 16 18 19 16 0.807412 199/200 Runs
17 20 22 21 24 22 18 14 20 22 0.917870 197/200 Serial
24 19 20 19 21 17 18 25 14 23 0.825505 197/200 Serial
Cadence Spectre simulations are used to generate raw delay
data. Delay variability assessment is conducted by 3σ Monte
Carlo sampling over process parameters. This test uses IBM
130 nm PDK. A common centroid layout is employed to
reduce linear gradient errors [29].
We construct an 8-level barrel shifter accepting a 256-bit
input with a 256-bit output. Output logic similar to input
capture logic in [30] detects output voltage changes. Voltage
transitions send a control signal to a counter. Path delay is
captured at the resolution of the counter’s clock period; a
period of 4ns is used. Delays must be a reasonable multiple
of the clock period to express variation.
In the following experiments, we primarily focus on raw
data: (1) Monte Carlo sampling 200 times on the path from
input 0 to output 16 (2) Monte Carlo sampling 200 times on
all 256 paths with no shifting.
A. Inter-chip Variability
Shift path delay is a function of the silicon fabrication
process; it potentially exhibits PUF properties. Each shift path
terminates with entanglement logic requiring one bit. A bit
from the delay counter must be selected. The chosen bit must
exhibit sufficient variation.
Monte Carlo simulation captures single path delay variabil-
ity as a proxy for inter-chip delay variability. As shown in
Fig. 11, in 200 Monte Carlo samples for process parameters
perfromed on path x0 7→ y16, the delay ranges from 85 ns to
145 ns with an average around 120 ns. It is a ±25% (±30-
ns) variation. Counter output varies about ±8. This indicates
that roughly the least significant 3 bits of delay have significant
entropy in inter-PUF measurements. Thus, the LSB, 2nd LSB,
and 3rd LSB are candidates for entanglement.
B. Inter-chip Uniqueness
The chosen path delay bit must exhibit inter-chip unique-
ness. This requires significant variance between responses on
different chips. Pair-wise hamming distance (HD) is a criterion
that measures variability.
The HD of 200 path delay samples of 256-bit responses is
computed. Table III shows distribution of inter-chip HD for
LSB. Similar figures are given for 2nd LSB in Table IV. For
LSB, the mean HD is 127.99 bits with a standard deviation of
8.04 bits. For 2nd LSB, these values are 128.01 bits and 7.99
bits, respectively. HD 128 means roughly 50% of the response
bits differ. It is maximally unlikely that two BS-PUFs will
generate the same output.
C. Intra-chip Reproducibility
The usefulness of a single PUF relies on it producing a
consistent response to a challenge; they should be independent
from the environment. Tests are performed subjecting BS-PUF
to: (1) temperature variation (2) voltage supply variation. The
frequency of response bit flips is quantified.
Bit flip rate is frequency a bit changes from 0 7→ 1 or 1 7→ 0.
It is computed relative to some baseline response. Gathering
responses at common room temperature (25◦C) and supply
voltage (5V ) establishes this baseline. The percentage of path
delays where a bit flips is the bit flip rate. For example, the
LSB flipping in 64/256 paths represents a 25% bit flip rate.
BS-PUF retains a bit flip rate smaller than 18% under
environment variation. This is similar to the flip rate of
traditional RO PUFs [31].
1) Temperature Variation: Temperature is varied from 0 to
50◦C. Path delay of all 256 bit paths are gathered with Monte
Carlo sampling at 0◦C, 10◦C, 20◦C, 25◦C, 30◦C, 40◦C and
50◦C. The maximum path delay variation is −4ns to 5ns. The
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Fig. 11. Histogram for simulated forward path (x0 7→ y16) delay distribution.
25% inter-chip variability is shown.
counter logic increments at 4ns frequency; a ±1 bit change
in path delay is expected.
Knowing how temperature variation affects the chosen
entanglement bit is ideal; bit flip rate quantifies this. It is
computed in response to temperature variation, shown in Fig.
12. Vertical bars represent bit flips for LSB (blue) and 2nd
LSB (green). 2nd LSB flip rates is under 12% while LSB’s
flip rate is significantly higher. Thus, the 2nd LSB provides
better reproducibility.
2) Voltage Supply Variation: Supply voltage varies under
realistic conditions. Path delay of all 256 bit paths are gathered
with Monte Carlo sampling at supply voltages of 4.64V ,
4.70V , 4.76V , 4.82V , 4.88V and 4.94V .
Bit flip rate is computed in response to voltage variation,
shown in Fig. 13. Flip rates for the 2nd LSB is under 18%
while LSB rates are significantly higher. The 2nd LSB again
provides better reproducibility; it is the best candidate for the
entanglement bit.
A higher order bit could be selected. It would have compar-
atively better flip rates, but reduced variability. Many mature
techniques exist to compensate for temperature and voltage
variation [32], [33]. These techniques operate at the flip rates
expressed by LSB and 2nd LSB. Thus, the advantage of
choosing a higher order bit is minimal.
D. Randomness
Output of a good PUF should look like a pseudo-random
number generator so that an attacker cannot model it easily.
Assessing randomness performance of BS-PUF uses data
from Monte Carlo sampling of path delays. Delay values are
converted to binary responses by extracting the mth LSB bit
from the delay. Each 256-bit response (one bit from each path)
is examined using NIST statistical test suite.
Table I and Table II give the detailed test results for LSB
and 2nd LSB of the BS-PUFs output. The minimum pass rate
for each statistical test is 193 for a sample size of 200 binary
TABLE III
INTRA-CHIP HD OF BS-PUFS LSB
(HD: HAMMING DISTANCE; %: PERCENTAGE OF BIT-STREAM PAIRS WITH
CERTAIN HD)
HD [90, 100) [100, 110) [110, 120) [120, 130)
% 0.01% 1.11% 13.46% 42.83%
HD [130, 140) [140, 150) [150, 160) [160, 170)
% 35.03% 7.17% 0.38% 0.01%
TABLE IV
INTRA-CHIP HD OF BS-PUFS 2ND LSB
(HD: HAMMING DISTANCE; %: PERCENTAGE OF BIT-STREAM PAIRS WITH
CERTAIN HD)
HD [90, 100) [100, 110) [110, 120) [120, 130)
% 0.12% 2.57% 15.68% 37.12%
HD [130, 140) [140, 150) [150, 160)
% 37.29% 6.25% 0.97%
sequences according to NIST documentation. Thus, both LSB
and 2nd LSB pass the randomness test; a proportion greater
than 193 is achieved on all tests.
E. Commutativity
Encryption and decryption rely on function composition.
Decrypting a message encrypted by both self and another party
is required. The other party may have changed the bit values
(0 or 1). Thus, Delay variation must be independent of the
bit value. An input of 1 must have the same path delay as an
input of 0.
BS-PUF path delays depend only on the permutation key.
Shift units are sized to achieve balanced pullup and pulldown
resistance. Transmission gate NMOS sizing is Wn/Ln = 2/3
PMOS sizing is Wp/Lp = 1/1, where Ln = Lp.
Two tests are performed to verify pullup and pulldown
variability.
1) Testing rising/falling edge delay in four different (FF,
FS, SF, SS) process corners. Transmission time differ-
ence for 0 and 1 must be smaller than the counter period
(4ns).
2) Performing Monte Carlo sampling of path delay for
inputs 0 and 1. Delays are recorded for all paths without
bit shifting. No bit flips should occur in the path delay.
Maximum transmission time difference for 0 and 1 is
2.34ns; this is much smaller than the 4ns clock period.
Consequently, no path delay bits flip in Monte Carlo sampling.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Modeling Attack
According to [34], all examined Strong PUFs under a given
size can be modeled with machine learning with success rates
above their stability in silicon. Consider the barrel shifter in
our communication protocol to be a black box. Attackers know
nothing about the key and physical delay of barrel shifter. An
attacker should not be able to model the relationship from
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Fig. 12. Percentage of bit flips under temperature variation. Flip rates
demonstrate signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) under different temperatures. Flip
rates of LSB are shown in blue. Flip rates of 2nd LSB are shown in green.
The flip rate of LSB is much higher than 2nd LSB.
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Fig. 13. Percentage of bit flips under voltage variation. Flip rates of LSB are
shown in blue. Flip rates of 2nd LSB are shown in green.
input bits to the output bits. Such a model provides an eaves-
dropper information about the plaintext given a ciphertext.
To investigate the resilience of BS-PUFs against modeling
attacks, various ciphertexts are generated with different keys
and plaintexts for training and cross-validation.
Logistic Regression (LR) [35] and Evolution Strategies (ES)
[36], [37] are commonly used to model PUF output. ES is
specialized to modeling PUFs under noisy conditions [34];
it does not apply when voltage supply and temperature are
certain.
Thus, only LR modeling is performed. Since the error rate of
machine learning prediction decreases with the size of training
set, LR modeling is tested for LSB response and 2nd LSB
response with a variety of training sets with different sizes.
Monte Carlo Sampling [38] utilizes randomness to gen-
TABLE V
LR ON LSB WITH 6 AND 8 STAGES BS-PUFS
ML
Method
Bit
Length
Prediction
Rate
PCPs Training
Time
LR 64
17.5%
28.6%
58.3%
800
8,000
80,000
0.0203 sec
0.3580 sec
1.3157 sec
LR 256
9.1%
18.3%
25.5%
1000
10,000
100,000
0.0186 sec
0.3670 sec
2.3212 sec
erate n challenge response pairs (CRP). n random keys,
K = {K0,K1, . . . ,Kn} are generated. Responses, R, are
generated by entangling plaintext, P , using these keys, Ri =
BS − PUF (P,Ki). Note that the response is the shift path
delay; this is dependent on the key only. Hence, the plaintext
need not be modified. This random CRP sample is assumed
to be representative of the distribution of all CRP.
Simulating BS − PUF (P,Ki) requires computationally
expensive Cadence Spectre simulations. An efficient method
for computing Ri given Ki is needed. Thus, we apply Monte
Carlo Sampling to create a delay matrix, D, modeling the
delay of all shift paths. The delay of each shift unit is recorded.
Path delay is then computed by: (1) summing the delay of all
shift units along a path, (2) dividing it by 4ns capture logic
resolution, (3) extracting LSB or 2nd LSB. Thus, D enables
computations of path delays given Ki. For example, Eq. (1)
is a sample delay matrix for 4 inputs, 2 stage BS-PUFs. di,j
represents exact delay value of top and bottom transmission
gates in ith row, jth column shift unit.
D =

(d0,0,t, d0,0,b) (d0,1,t, d0,1,b)
(d1,0,t, d1,0,b) (d1,1,t, d1,1,b)
(d2,0,t, d2,0,b) (d2,1,t, d2,1,b)
(d3,0,t, d3,0,b) (d3,1,t, d3,1,b)
 (1)
Plaintext-ciphertext pairs (PCP) are computed using D. For
the delay matrix in Eq. (1) using a key = {1, 0} encoding
for right shift in the first stage, the plaintext (i0, i1, i2, i3)
generates the response in Eq. (2).
R =

i3 ⊕ ((d0,0,b + d0,1,t)/4)m
i0 ⊕ ((d1,0,b + d1,1,t)/4)m
i1 ⊕ ((d2,0,b + d2,1,t)/4)m
i2 ⊕ ((d3,0,b + d3,1,t)/4)m
 (2)
This process makes extraction of all possible PCP feasible.
For a BS-PUF with an input message length of 256-bit,
there are 2256 possible input messages. There are 8 stages
with 28 possible keys. It is infeasible to generate all 2264 PCPs.
Linear Regression (LR) is performed with a training set of size
n = {10, 100, 1000} PCPs per key. To obtain a representative
sample of PCPs, responses are computed with 100 keys and
10, 000 plaintexts. PCPs not part of the training set are used
for cross-validation. Scalability experiments are conducted on
a 6-stage, 64-bit input BS-PUF; delay matrix of this BS-PUF
is the top left 64 × 6 sub-matrix of the 8-stage delay matrix
TABLE VI
LR ON 2ND LSB WITH 6 AND 8 STAGES BS-PUFS
ML
Method
Bit
Length
Prediction
Rate
PCPs Training
Time
LR 64
43.2%
52.6%
79.5%
800
8,000
80,000
0.0315 sec
0.1658 sec
1.0104 sec
LR 256
32.4%
41.0%
62.8%
1000
10,000
100,000
0.0157 sec
0.4620 sec
1.6245 sec
acquired from Monte Carlo Sampling. The number of CRPs
NCRP that are required to learn a k-stage arbiter PUF with
error rate  is 0.5×(k+1)/ [34]. Thus, for a 6 stage BS-PUF,
we also scale down n to 8, 80, and 800 PCPs per key.
Table V and Table VI show the prediction accuracy of LR
on LSB and 2nd LSB. LR is implemented by an iterative
program written in Matlab. The regression coefficients’ initial
values are set to (0, 0) in all LR applications. Silicon stability
of BS-PUFs is 75%. Thus, all modeling reaching a higher
prediction rate should be considered a success.
LSB provides better result than 2nd LSB. LR achieves
79.5% prediction rate for 6-stage BS-PUF 2nd LSB output.
If 2nd LSB is used as the delay bit, then LR can successfully
model 6-stage BS-PUF with sufficient number of PCPs. On the
other hand, with the same modeling process, LSB cannot be
modeled even with a large number of training samples. This is
expected as the LSB is inherently more variable. Consequently,
the choice to use LSB or 2nd LSB for the delay bit presents
a tradeoff between security and reproducibility; LSB provides
the former while 2nd LSB provides the latter.
B. Speed Performance
One of the most important advantages of BS-PUFs based
encryption is its faster encryption than other traditional sym-
metric encryption schemes, such as AES. In this section,
comparison is made between BS-PUFs encryption and AES.
BS-PUF based encryption outperforms conventional AES
implementations. Some exceptions relying on high-speed
crypto processors and architectures exist [39]. Performing
AES Encryption on a modern Intel Pentium Pro processor
requires 18 clock cycles per byte. Decryption takes even more
cycles with a conservative estimate of 36 clock cycles per
byte for encryption/decryption round-trip. This time increases
as the block size increases. Comparatively, BS-PUF-based
encryption (1.6 clock cycles per byte per BS-PUF resulting
in 6.4 clock cycles for both encryption/decryption) is an
order of magnitude improvement. In addition, BS-PUF-based
encryption scales better, because encryption delay is near-
constant (log n delay for block size n) regardless of block
length.
This work proposes a protocol for data transmission using
BS-PUF. It necessitates multiple-message round transaction
between sender and receiver. This incurs transmission over-
head.
The BS-PUF protocol has advantages over AES in encryp-
tion speed.
C. Area Needs
BS-PUF does very little mathematical computation; protec-
tion is provided by the physical properties of the encryption
device. Little area is required due to this simplicity. In compar-
ison, AES performs many more computations requiring greater
area.
According to [40], 32-bit FPGA-based AES encryption
contains 8, 300 2-input NAND gate equivalents. A 32-bit BS-
PUF requires 2, 400 transistors, which is 600 2-input NAND
gate equivalents. This evaluation is not technology dependent.
VIII. FUTURE WORK
Much needs to be addressed to establish the practicality of
commutative PUFs. An evaluation of PUFs based on more
relevant permutation families such as Keccak sponge family
[23], [24] is needed. Overhead of reversible implementations,
which also offer invertibility, of these functions need to be
assessed. With invertibility, asymmetric encryption is also
feasible. We are exploring asymmetric encryption direction.
Another important research direction is quantification of secu-
rity offered by BS-PUF vs AES.
The impact of PUF noise requires more discussion. The
proposed design uses raw PUF responses; it will therefore be
noisier than traditional PUFs. An error coding scheme using
helper data and some form of fuzzy extraction is required.
Once we have designs for a realistic permutation family,
similar evaluations are needed for their robustness. Path de-
lay distributions across chips need to show variability and
uniqueness; within the same PUF different paths need to show
variability and randomness; temperature and supply voltage
caused delay variation needs to be small enough. In addition,
resource needs for these implementations need to be evaluated
in terms of area, time and energy. The timer for input capture
may impose an insignificant overhead. Its accuracy plays a
central role in feasibility of BS-PUFs.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we explore variety of encryption protocols
based on commutative PUFs and propose a circuit implemen-
tation of the required commutative PUFs (BS-PUF). Commu-
tativity relies on symmetric delays in forward and backward
paths regardless of the message bit state. Spectre Monte
Carlo simulations indicate only less than 1 bit delay offset
is introduced by plaintext bit state variation. This ensure the
commutativity of the system. Simulation shows that inter-chip
variability (up to ±25% chip-to-chip variation) is acceptable.
These encryption PUFs have potential to root the encryption in
hardware, hence increasing robustness beyond current software
only solutions.
Asymmetric encryption methods are valued for their ability
to establish a secure communication channel in the absence
of a priori shared secret. Such methods require complex
computations resulting in low throughput compared to sym-
metric encryption. BS-PUF has the potential to provide an
asymmetric encryption method with performance similar to
AES (symmetric encryption).
Basing encryption in hardware limits the attack surface.
An adversary cannot retrieve the message even when both
encryption key and ciphertext are known; information about
the PUF behavior is not available to them. The behavior of
the encryption function becomes a secret. Thus, more entropy
is added to the system. Besides, BS-PUF based encryption
provides much better speed and area performance than AES.
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